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Abstract
Operators of online social networks are increasingly
sharing potentially sensitive information about users and
their relationships with advertisers, application developers,
and data-mining researchers. Privacy is typically protected
by anonymization, i.e., removing names, addresses, etc.
We present a framework for analyzing privacy and
anonymity in social networks and develop a new
re-identification algorithm targeting anonymized social-
network graphs. To demonstrate its effectiveness on real-
world networks, we show that a third of the users who
can be verified to have accounts on both Twitter, a popular
microblogging service, and Flickr, an online photo-sharing
site, can be re-identified in the anonymous Twitter graph
with only a 12% error rate.
Our de-anonymization algorithm is based purely on the
network topology, does not require creation of a large
number of dummy “sybil” nodes, is robust to noise and all
existing defenses, and works even when the overlap between
the target network and the adversary’s auxiliary information
is small.
1. Introduction
Social networks have been studied for a century [74] and
are a staple of research in disciplines such as epidemiol-
ogy [8], sociology [82], [32], [12], economics [33], and
many others [22], [9], [36]. The recent proliferation of online
social networks such as MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, and so
on has attracted attention of computer scientists, as well [45].
Even in the few online networks that are completely
open, there is a disconnect between users’ willingness to
share information and their reaction to unintended parties
viewing or using this information [16]. Most operators thus
provide at least some privacy controls. Many online and
virtually all offline networks (e.g., telephone calls, email
and instant messages, etc.) restrict access to the information
about individual members and their relationships.
Network owners often share this information with ad-
vertising partners and other third parties. Such sharing is
the foundation of the business case for many online social-
network operators. Some networks are even published for re-
search purposes. To alleviate privacy concerns, the networks
are anonymized, i.e., names and demographic information
associated with individual nodes are suppressed. Such sup-
pression is often misinterpreted as removal of “personally
identifiable information” (PII), even though PII may include
much more than names and identifiers (see the discussion
in Appendix B). For example, the EU privacy directive
defines “personal data” as “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person [. . . ]; an identifiable
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly,
in particular by reference to an identification number or to
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity” [26].
Anonymity has been unquestioningly interpreted as equiv-
alent to privacy in several high-profile cases of data sharing.
After a New York court ruling ordering Google to hand
over viewing data of over 100 million YouTube users to
Viacom and the subsequent protests from privacy advocates,
a revised agreement was struck under which Google would
anonymize the data before handing it over [79]. The CEO
of NebuAd, a U.S. company that offers targeted advertising
based on browsing histories gathered from ISPs, dismissed
privacy concerns by saying that “We don’t have any raw
data on the identifiable individual. Everything is anony-
mous” [18]. Phorm, a U.K. company with a similar business
model, aims to collect the data on Web-surfing habits of
70% of British broadband users; the only privacy protection
is that user identities are mapped to random identifiers [77].
In social networks, too, user anonymity has been used as
the answer to all privacy concerns (see Section 2).
Our contributions. This is the first paper to demonstrate
feasibility of large-scale, passive de-anonymization of real-
world social networks.
First, we survey the current state of data sharing in social
networks, the intended purpose of each type of sharing, the
resulting privacy risks, and the wide availability of auxiliary
information which can aid the attacker in de-anonymization.
Second, we formally define privacy in social networks and
relate it to node anonymity. We identify several categories of
attacks, differentiated by attackers’ resources and auxiliary
information. We also give a methodology for measuring the
extent of privacy breaches in social networks, which is an
interesting problem in its own right.
Third, we develop a generic re-identification algorithm for
anonymized social networks. The algorithm uses only the
network structure, does not make any a priori assumptions
about membership overlap between multiple networks, and
defeats all known defenses.
Fourth, we give a concrete demonstration of how our de-
anonymization algorithm works by applying it to Flickr and
Twitter, two large, real-world online social networks. We
show that a third of the users who are verifiable members of
both Flickr and Twitter1 can be recognized in the completely
anonymous Twitter graph with only 12% error rate, even
though the overlap in the relationships for these members is
less than 15%!
Sharing of anonymized social-network data is widespread
and the auxiliary information needed for our attack is
commonly available. We argue that our work calls for a
substantial re-evaluation of business practices surrounding
the sharing of social-network data.
2. State of the Union
The attacks described in this paper target anonymized,
sanitized versions of social networks, using partial auxiliary
information about a subset of their members. To show that
both anonymized networks and auxiliary information are
widely available, we survey real-world examples of social-
network data sharing, most of which involve releasing more
information than needed for our attack.
Academic and government data-mining. Social networks
used for published data-mining research include the mobile-
phone call graphs of, respectively, 7 million [63], 3 mil-
lion [60], and 2.5 million [48] customers, as well as the
land-line phone graph of 2.1 million Hungarian users [47].
Corporations like AT&T, whose own database of 1.9 trillion
phone calls goes back decades [39], have in-house research
facilities, but smaller operators must share their graphs with
external researchers. Phone-call networks are also commonly
used to detect illicit activity such as calling fraud [90] and for
national security purposes, such as identifying the command-
and-control structures of terrorist cells by their idiosyncratic
sub-network topologies [39]. A number of companies sell
data-mining solutions to governments for this purpose [75].
Sociologists, epidemiologists, and health-care profession-
als collect data about geographic, friendship, family, and
sexual networks to study disease propagation and risk.
For example, the Add Health dataset includes the sexual-
relationship network of almost 1,000 students of an anony-
mous Midwestern high school as part of a detailed survey
on adolescent health [2]. While the Add Health project takes
a relatively enlightened stance on privacy [1], this graph has
been published in an anonymized form [11].
For online social networks, the data can be collected
by crawling either via an API, or “screen-scraping” (e.g.,
Mislove et al. crawled Flickr, YouTube, LiveJournal, and
Orkut [58]; anonymized graphs are available by request
only). We stress that even when obtained from public
1. At the time of our crawl; details are in Section 6.
websites, this kind of information—if publicly released—
still presents privacy risks because it helps attackers who
lack resources for massive crawls. In some online networks,
such as LiveJournal and the Experience Project, user profiles
and relationship data are public, but many users maintain
pseudonymous profiles. From the attacker’s perspective, this
is the same as publishing the anonymized network.
Advertising. With the emergence of concrete evidence that
social-network data makes commerce much more prof-
itable [70], [78], network operators are increasingly shar-
ing their graphs with advertising partners to enable better
social targeting of advertisements. For example, Facebook
explicitly says that users’ profiles may be shared for the
purpose of personalizing advertisements and promotions, as
long as the individual is not explicitly identified [27]. Both
Facebook and MySpace allow advertisers to use friends’
profile data for ad targeting [20]. Social-network-driven
advertising has been pursued by many startups [24], [59]
and even Google [71], typically relying on anonymity to
prevent privacy breaches [5], [25], [62].
Third-party applications. The number of third-party appli-
cations on Facebook alone is in the tens of thousands and
rapidly growing [72]. The data from multiple applications
can be aggregated and used for targeted advertising (e.g., as
done by SocialMedia [69]). As the notion of social network-
ing as a feature rather than destination takes hold [4], many
other networks are trying to attract application developers;
on the Ning platform, which claims over 275,000 networks,
each network can be considered a third-party application.
The data given to third-party applications is usually not
anonymized, even though most applications would be able
to function on anonymized profiles [28].
Third-party applications have a poor track record of
respecting privacy policies. For example, a security hole in
a Facebook application developed by Slide, Inc. “exposed
the birthdays, gender, and relationship status of strangers,
including Facebook executives, [and] the wife of Google
co-founder Larry Page” [57]. WidgetLaboratory, one of the
most popular developers for the Ning platform, was banned
permanently after “gathering credentials from users and
otherwise creating havoc on Ning networks” [6]. Therefore,
it is important to understand what a malicious third-party
application can learn about members of a social network,
even if it obtains the data in an anonymized form.
Aggregation. Aggregation of information from multiple
social networks, facilitated by projects such as OpenID [64],
DataPortability [21], the “social graph” project [29], and
various microformats [56], potentially presents a greater
threat to individual privacy than one-time data releases.
Existing aggregators include FriendFeed, MyBlogLog, Jaiku
(recently acquired by Google), and Plaxo; the latter even
provides an open-source “social graph crawler” [67]. Ag-
gregated networks are an excellent source of auxiliary in-
formation for our attacks.
Other data-release scenarios. WellNet is a health-care co-
ordination service which enables employers to monitor the
social network in real time in order to track employees’
medical and pharmacy activity [55]. The data is anonymized.
In “friend-to-friend networking,” a peer-to-peer file-
sharing network is overlaid on social links [68] in order to
defeat censor nodes such as the RIAA. Nodes are pseudony-
mous and communication is encrypted. Since traffic is
typically not anonymized at the network level, the logs that
can be obtained, for example, by subpoenaing the ISP are
essentially anonymized social-network graphs.
Finally, consider photographs published online without
identifying information. The accuracy of face recognition
can be improved substantially by exploiting the fact that
users who appear together in photographs are likely to be
neighbors in the social network [76]. Since most online pho-
tographs appear in a social-network context, they effectively
represent an anonymized graph, and techniques developed
in this paper can help in large-scale facial re-identification.
3. Related Work
Privacy properties. A social network consists of nodes,
edges, and information associated with each node and edge.
The existence of an edge between two nodes can be sen-
sitive: for instance, in a sexual-relationship network with
gender information attached to nodes [11] it can reveal
sexual orientation. Edge privacy was considered in [44], [7].
In most online social networks, however, edges are public
by default, and few users change the default settings [34].
While the mere presence of an edge may not be sensitive,
edge attributes may reveal more information (e.g., a single
phone call vs. a pattern of calls indicative of a business
or romantic relationship). For example, phone-call patterns
of the disgraced NBA referee Tom Donaghy have been
used in the investigation [91]. In online networks such as
LiveJournal, there is much variability in the semantics of
edge relationships [30].
The attributes attached to nodes, such as the user’s inter-
ests, are usually far more sensitive. Social Security numbers
can be predicted from Facebook profiles with higher accu-
racy than random guessing [34]; see [17] for other privacy
breaches based on profile data. Even implicit attributes such
as node degree can be highly sensitive, e.g., in a sexual
network [11]. Existing defenses focus on names and other
identifiers, but basic de-anonymization only reveals that
someone belongs to the network, which is hardly sensitive.
As we show in the rest of this paper, however, it can be used
as a vehicle for more serious attacks on privacy, including
disclosure of sensitive attributes.
De-anonymization attacks. Backstrom et al. present two
active attacks on edge privacy in anonymized social net-
works [7]. These active attacks fundamentally assume that
the adversary is able to modify the network prior to its re-
lease: “an adversary chooses an arbitrary set of users whose
privacy it wishes to violate, creates a small number of new
user accounts with edges to these targeted users, and creates
a pattern of links among the new accounts with the goal
of making it stand out in the anonymized graph structure.”
Both attacks involve creating O(logN) new “sybil” nodes
(N is the total number of nodes), whose outgoing edges help
re-identify quadratically as many existing nodes.
Active attacks are difficult to stage on a large scale.
First, they are restricted to online social networks (OSNs);
creating thousands of fake nodes in a phone-call or real-life
network is prohibitively expensive or impossible. Even in
OSNs, many operators (e.g., Facebook) check the uniqueness
of email addresses and deploy other methods for verifying
accuracy of supplied information, making creation of a large
number of dummy nodes relatively difficult.
Second, the attacker has little control over the edges
incoming to the nodes he creates. Because most legitimate
users will have no reason to link back to the sybil nodes, a
subgraph with no incoming edges but many outgoing edges
will stand out. As we show below, this may enable the
network operator to recognize that the network has been
compromised by a sybil attack. There are also other tech-
niques for identifying sybil attacks in social networks [93],
including methods for spammer detection deployed by OSNs
that allow unidirectional edges [73].
We carried out an experiment to verify the claim that
identification of subgraphs consisting primarily of sybil
nodes is difficult in real-world social networks. The data
for this experiment was the graph of LiveJournal obtained
from Mislove et al. [58], crawled in late 2006. It is a directed
graph with 5.3 million nodes and 77 million edges. Except
for the time of the crawl, this graph is similar to that used
in [7].
The cut-based attack of [7] creates 7-node subgraphs
containing a Hamiltonian path. In contrast to the observation
in [7] that every possible 7-node subgraph containing a
Hamiltonian path occurs in the LiveJournal graph, there
are no subgraphs in the LiveJournal graph that have these
two properties and, furthermore, do not have any incoming
edges. We conclude that active attacks are easy to detect if
real users never link back to sybil nodes. More sophisticated
sybil-detection techniques may work as long as only a small
percentage of real users link back to sybil nodes.
The third limitation of active attacks is the fact that many
OSNs require a link to be mutual before the information is
made available in any form. Therefore, assuming that real
users do not link back to dummy users, the links from fake
nodes to real ones do not show up in the network.
We conclude that large-scale active attacks requiring cre-
ation of tens of thousands of sybil nodes are unlikely to be
feasible. Active attacks can still be useful in identifying or
creating a small set of “seeds” to serve as a starting point
for large-scale, passive privacy breaches. We develop such
an attack in Section 5.2.
Backstrom et al. also describe passive attacks, in which
a small coalition of users discover their location in the
anonymized graph by utilizing the knowledge of the network
structure around them. This attack is realistic, but again,
only works on a small scale: the colluding users can only
compromise the privacy of some of the users who are already
their friends.
By contrast, our attack does not require creation of a large
number of sybil nodes, and—as shown by our experiments
on real-world online social networks—can be successfully
deployed on a very large scale.
Defenses. Existing privacy protection mechanisms for social
networks are only effective against very restricted adver-
saries and have been evaluated on small, simulated networks
whose characteristics are different from real social networks.
For example, Zheleva and Getoor give several strategies for
preventing link re-identification [94], but the model ignores
auxiliary information that may be available to the attacker.
An unusual attempt to prevent network operators from
capitalizing on user-provided data appears in [35]. It in-
volves scrambling the profiles when they are sent to the
server and client-side unscrambling when a friend’s profile
is viewed. Building and running such a system involves
constant reverse-engineering of communication between the
client and the server. Further, all of a user’s friends need
to use the system, flatly contradicting the claim of incre-
mental deployability. A similar idea appears in [52], with
a more sound architecture based on a server-side Facebook
application. Both approaches severely cripple social-network
functionality because almost any non-trivial action other
than viewing another user’s profile or messages requires the
server to manipulate the data in a way which is not possible
under encryption.
Anonymity is a popular approach to protecting privacy.
Felt and Evans propose a system where applications see
randomized tokens representing users instead of actual iden-
tifiers [28]. Frikken and Golle show how to compute an
anonymous graph from pieces held by different participants
in order to perform privacy-preserving social-network anal-
ysis [31]. Kerschbaum and Schaad additionally enable par-
ticipants to track their position in the anonymous graph [43].
Several papers proposed variants of k-anonymity for so-
cial networks. For example, Hay et al. require nodes to
be automorphically equivalent [38], i.e., there must exist
automorphisms of the graph that map each of k nodes to one
another. This is an extremely strong structural requirement,
which is achieved only against severely restricted adver-
saries: in one model, the attacker only has information about
degree sequences around his target node; in another, partial
knowledge of the structure in the vicinity of the target. The
technique appears to work only if the average degree is low,
ruling out most online social networks.
Liu and Terzi consider node re-identification assuming
that the adversary’s auxiliary information consists only of
node degrees [51]. There is no clear motivation for this
restriction. Campan and Truta propose metrics for the infor-
mation loss caused by edge addition and deletion and apply
k-anonymity to node attributes as well as neighborhood
structure [15]. Zhou and Pei assume that the adversary
knows the exact 1-neighborhood of the target node [95].
The anonymization algorithm attempts to make this 1-
neighborhood isomorphic to k − 1 other 1-neighborhoods
via edge addition. The experiments are performed on an
undirected network with average degree 4 (an order of
magnitude lower than that in real social networks) and
already require increasing the number of edges by 6%. The
number of edges to be added and the computational effort
are likely to rise sharply with the average degree.
The fundamental problem with k-anonymity is that it is
a syntactic property which may not provide any privacy
even when satisfied (e.g., if all k isomorphic neighborhoods
have the same value of some sensitive attributes). Crucially,
all of these defenses impose arbitrary restrictions on the
information available to the adversary and make arbitrary
assumptions about the properties of the social network.
We argue that the auxiliary information which is likely to
be available to the attacker is global in nature (e.g., another
social network with partially overlapping membership) and
not restricted to the neighborhood of a single node. In the
rest of this paper, we show how this information, even
if very noisy, can be used for large-scale re-identification.
Existing models fail to capture self-reinforcing, feedback-
based attacks, in which re-identification of some nodes
provides the attacker with more auxiliary information, which
is then used for further re-identification. Development of a
model for such attacks is our primary contribution.
4. Model and Definitions
4.1. Social network
A social network S consists of (1) a directed graph
G = (V,E), and (2) a set of attributes X for each node
in V (for instance, name, telephone number, etc.) and
a set of attributes Y for each edge in E (for instance,
type of relationship). The model is agnostic as to whether
attributes accurately reflect real-world identities or not (see
Appendix C). We treat attributes as atomic values from a
discrete domain; this is important for our formal definition of
privacy breach (Definition 3 below). Real-valued attributes
must be discretized. Where specified, we will also represent
edges as attributes in Y taking values in {0, 1}.
In addition to the explicit attributes, some privacy policies
may be concerned with implicit attributes, i.e., properties of
a node or an edge that are based purely on the graph struc-
ture. For example, node degree can be a sensitive implicit
attribute. Implicit attributes may be leaked without disclos-
ing any explicit attributes. For example, if the adversary re-
identifies a subset of nodes in an anonymized graph, none
of which are adjacent, he learns the degrees of these nodes
without breaking edge privacy. Which implicit attributes
should be protected depends on the specific network.
4.2. Data release
Our model of the data release process focuses on what
types of data are released and how the data is sanitized (if
at all), and abstracts away from the procedural distinctions
such as whether the data is available in bulk or obtained
by crawling the network. As discussed in Section 2, social-
network data are routinely released to advertisers, applica-
tion developers, and researchers. Advertisers are often given
access to the entire graph in a (presumably) anonymized
form and a limited number of relevant attributes for each
node. Application developers, in current practice, get access
to a subgraph via user opt-in and most or all of the attributes
within this subgraph. This typically includes the identifying
attributes, even if they are not essential for the application’s
functionality [28]. Researchers may receive the entire graph
or a subgraph (up to the discretion of the network owner)
and a limited set of non-identifying attributes.
“Anonymization” is modeled by publishing only a subset
of attributes. Unlike naı¨ve approaches such as k-anonymity,
we do not distinguish identifying and non-identifying at-
tributes (any attribute can be identifying if it happens
to be known to the adversary as part of his auxiliary
information). Suppressed attributes are not limited to the
demographic quasi-identifiers a priori; we simply assume
that the published attributes by themselves are insufficient
for re-identification. In Section 4.4, we explain the (indirect)
connection between preventing node re-identification and in-
tuitive “privacy.” In terms of entropy, most of the information
in the released graph resides in the edges, and this is what
our de-anonymization algorithm will exploit.
The data release process may involve perturbation or
sanitization that changes the graph structure in some way to
make re-identification attacks harder. As we argued in Sec-
tion 3, deterministic methods that attempt to make different
nodes look identical do not work on realistic networks. Other
defenses are based on injecting random noise into the graph
structure. The most promising one is link prediction [50],
which produces plausible fake edges by exploiting the fact
that edges in social-network graphs have a high clustering
coefficient. (We stress that link prediction is far beyond the
existing sanitization techniques, which mostly rely on simple
removal of identifiers.) The experiments in Section 6.2
show that our algorithm is robust to injected noise, whether
resulting from link prediction or not. In Appendix E, we
discuss how to measure the amount of noise introduced by
perturbation.
We model the data sanitization and release process as
follows. First, select a subset of nodes, Vsan ⊂ V , and
subsets Xsan ⊆ X ,Ysan ⊆ Y of node and edge attributes
to be released. Second, compute the induced subgraph on
Vsan. For simplicity, we do not model more complex criteria
for releasing edge, e.g., based on edge attributes. Third,
remove some edges and add fake edges. Release Ssan =
(Vsan, Esan, {X(v)∀v ∈ Vsan, X ∈ Xsan}, {Y (e)∀e ∈
Esan, Y ∈ Ysan}), i.e., a sanitized subset of nodes and
edges with the corresponding attributes.
4.3. Threat model
As described in Section 2, network owners release
anonymized and possibly sanitized network graphs to com-
mercial partners and academic researchers. Therefore, we
take it for granted that the attacker will have access to such
data. The main question we answer in the rest of this paper
is: can sensitive information about specific individuals be
extracted from anonymized social-network graphs?
Attack scenarios. Attackers fall into different categories
depending on their capabilities and goals. The strongest
adversary is a government-level agency interested in global
surveillance. Such an adversary can be assumed to already
have access to a large auxiliary network Saux (see below).
His objective is large-scale collection of detailed informa-
tion about as many individuals as possible. This involves
aggregating the anonymous network Ssan with Saux by
recognizing nodes that correspond to the same individuals.
Another attack scenario involves abusive marketing. A
commercial enterprise, especially one specializing in behav-
ioral ad targeting [81], [92], can easily obtain an anonymized
social-network graph from the network operator for adver-
tising purposes. As described in Sections 1 and 2, anonymity
is often misinterpreted as privacy. If an unethical company
were able to de-anonymize the graph using publicly available
data, it could engage in abusive marketing aimed at specific
individuals. Phishing and spamming also gain from social-
network de-anonymization. Using detailed information about
the victim gleaned from his or her de-anonymized social-
network profile, a phisher or a spammer will be able to craft
a highly individualized, believable message (cf. [41]).
Yet another category of attacks involves targeted de-
anonymization of specific individuals by stalkers, investi-
gators, nosy colleagues, employers, or neighbors. In this
scenario, the attacker has detailed contextual information
about a single individual, which may include some of her
attributes, a few of her social relationships, membership
in other networks, and so on. The objective is to use
this information to recognize the victim’s node in the
anonymized network and to learn sensitive information about
her, including all of her social relationships in that network.
Modeling the attacker. We assume that in addition to the
anonymized, sanitized target network Ssan, the attacker also
has access to a different network Saux whose membership
partially overlaps with S. The assumption that the attacker
possesses such an auxiliary network is very realistic. First,
it may be possible to extract Saux directly from S: for
example, parts of some online networks can be automatically
crawled, or a malicious third-party application can provide
information about the subgraph of users who installed
it. Second, the attacker may collude with an operator of
a different network whose membership overlaps with S.
Third, the attacker may take advantage of several ongoing
aggregation projects (see Section 2). The intent of these
projects is benign, but they facilitate the creation of a
global auxiliary network combining bits and pieces of public
information about individuals and their relationships from
multiple sources. Fourth, government-level aggregators, such
as intelligence and law enforcement agencies, can collect
data via surveillance and court-authorized searches. Depend-
ing on the type of the attacker, the nodes of his auxiliary
network may be a subset, a superset, or overlap with those
of the target network.
We emphasize that even with access to a substantial
auxiliary network Saux, de-anonymizing the target network
Ssan is a highly non-trivial task. First, the overlap between
the two networks may not be large. For the entities who
are members of both Saux and S, some social relationships
may be preserved, i.e., if two nodes are connected in Saux,
the corresponding nodes in S are also connected with a
non-negligible probability, but many of the relationships
in each network are unique to that network. Even if the
same entity belongs to both networks, it is not immediately
clear how to recognize that a certain anonymous node from
Ssan corresponds to the same entity as a given node from
Saux. Therefore, easy availability of auxiliary information
does not directly imply that anonymized social networks are
vulnerable to privacy breaches.
Our formal model of the attacker includes both aggre-
gate auxiliary information (large-scale information from
other data sources and social networks whose membership
overlaps with the target network) and individual auxiliary
information (identifiable details about a small number of in-
dividuals from the target network and possibly relationships
between them). In the model, we consider edge relationship
to be a binary attribute in Y and all edge attributes Y ∈ Y
to be defined over V 2 instead of E. If (u, v) /∈ E, then
Y [u, v] =⊥ ∀Y ∈ Y .
Aggregate auxiliary information. It is essential that the
attacker’s auxiliary information may include relationships
between entities. Therefore, we model Saux as a graph
Gaux = {Vaux, Eaux} and a set of probability distribu-
tions AuxX and AuxY , one for each attribute of every node
in Vaux and each attribute of every edge in Eaux. These
distributions represent the adversary’s (imperfect) knowl-
edge of the corresponding attribute value. For example,
the adversary may be 80% certain that an edge between
two nodes is a “friendship” and 20% that it is a mere
“contact.” Since we treat edges themselves as attributes, this
also captures the attacker’s uncertain knowledge about the
existence of individual edges. This model works well in
practice, although it does not capture some types of auxiliary
information, such as “node v1 is connected to either node
v2, or node v3.”
For an attribute X of a node v (respectively, attribute Y
of an edge e), we represent by Aux[X, v] (resp., Aux[Y, e])
the attacker’s prior probability distribution (i.e., distribution
given by his auxiliary information) of the attribute’s value.
The set AuxX (resp., AuxY ) can be thought of as a union
of Aux[X, v] (resp., Aux[Y, e]) over all attributes and nodes
(resp., edges).
Aggregate auxiliary information is used in the the “prop-
agation” stage of our de-anonymization algorithm (Sec-
tion 5).
Individual auxiliary information (information about
seeds). We also assume that the attacker possesses detailed
information about a very small2 number of members of the
target network S. We assume that the attacker can determine
if these members are also present in his auxiliary network
Saux (e.g., by matching usernames and other contextual
information). The privacy question is whether this infor-
mation about a handful of members of S can be used, in
combination with Saux, to learn sensitive information about
other members of S.
It is not difficult to collect such data about a small number
of nodes. If the attacker is already a user of S, he knows all
details about his own node and its neighbors [44], [76]. Some
networks permit manual access to profiles even if large-
scale crawling is restricted (e.g., Facebook allows viewing
of information about “friends” of any member by default.)
Some users may make their details public even in networks
that keep them private by default. The attacker may even
pay a handful of users for information about themselves
and their friends [49], or learn it from compromised com-
puters or stolen mobile phones. For example, the stored
log of phone calls provides auxiliary information for de-
anonymizing the phone-call graph. With an active attack
(e.g., [7]), the attacker may create fake nodes and edges
in S with features that will be easy to recognize in the
anonymized version of S, such as a clique or an almost-
clique. Since large-scale active attacks are unlikely to be
feasible (see Section 3), we restrict their role to collecting
individual auxiliary information as a precursor to the main,
passive attack.
2. Negligible relative to the size of S. For example, in our experiments,
we find that between 30 and 150 seeds are sufficient for networks with 105
to 106 members.
Individual auxiliary information is used in the the “seed
identification” stage of our de-anonymization algorithm
(Section 5).
4.4. Breaching privacy
The notion of what should be considered private varies
from network to network and even from individual to indi-
vidual within the network. To keep our model independent
of the semantics of a particular network, we treat the privacy
policy as a syntactic, exogenous labeling that specifies for
every node attribute, edge, and edge attribute whether it
should be public or private. Formally, it is a function
PP:X ∪Y ×E → {pub, priv}. In Appendix D, we discuss
the challenges of rigorously defining privacy policies.
In this paper, we take an “operational” approach to social-
network privacy by focusing solely on node re-identification.
First, it is unclear how to give a meaningful definition of
social-network privacy that does not make some assumptions
about the attacker’s strategy and yet yields meaningful
results on real-world data. Second, all currently known
privacy-breaching and privacy-protection algorithms focus
on node re-identification. Even edge inference, in order to be
considered a meaningful privacy breach, must include learn-
ing some identifying information about the endpoints and
thus implies node re-identification. Third, while anonymity
is by no means sufficient for privacy3, it is clearly necessary.
A re-identification algorithm that breaks anonymity is thus
guaranteed to violate any reasonable definition of privacy, as
long as there are any sensitive attributes at all attached to the
nodes, since the algorithm re-labels the sensitive attributes
with identifying information.
We define ground truth to be a mapping µG between the
nodes Vaux of the attacker’s auxiliary network and the nodes
Vsan of the target network. Intuitively, a pair of nodes are
mapped to each other if they belong to the same “entity”
(see Appendix C). If µG(v) takes the special value ⊥, then
there is no mapping for node v (e.g., if v was not released
as part of Vsan). Further, µG need not map every node in
Vsan. This is important because the overlap between Vsan
and Vaux may be relatively small. We do assume that the
mapping is 1-1, i.e., an entity has at most one node in each
network, as discussed in Appendix C.
Node re-identification or re-labeling refers to finding a
mapping µ between a node in Vaux and a node in Vsan.
Intuitively, Gaux is a labeled graph and Gsan is unlabeled.
Node re-identification succeeds on a node vaux ∈ Vaux if
µ(v) = µG(v), and fails otherwise. The latter includes the
case that µ(v) =⊥, µG(v) 6=⊥ and vice versa. Informally,
3. For example, suppose that the attacker can map a node in Vaux to
a small set of nodes in Vsan which all have the same value for some
sensitive attribute. Anonymity is preserved (he does not know which of the
nodes corresponds to the target node), yet he still learns the value of his
target’s sensitive attribute.
re-identification is recognizing correctly that a given node
in the anonymized network belongs to the same entity as a
node in the attacker’s auxiliary network.
Definition 1 (Re-identification algorithm): A node re-
identification algorithm takes as input Ssan and Saux and
produces a probabilistic mapping µ˜:Vsan × (Vaux ∪ {⊥
}) → [0, 1], where µ˜(vaux, vsan) is the probability that
vaux maps to vsan.
We give such an algorithm in Section 5. Observe that the
algorithm outputs, for each node in Vaux, a set of candidate
nodes in Vsan and a probability distribution over those
nodes reflecting the attacker’s imperfect knowledge of the
re-identification mapping.
We now define the class of adversaries who attempt
to breach privacy via re-identification. After constructing
the mapping, the adversary updates his knowledge of the
attributes of Saux using the attribute values in Ssan.
Specifically, he can use the probability distribution over the
candidate nodes to derive a distribution over the attribute
values associated with these nodes. His success is measured
by the precision of his posterior knowledge of the attributes.
Definition 2 (Mapping adversary): A mapping adversary
corresponding to a probabilistic mapping µ˜ outputs a prob-
ability distribution calculated as follows:
Adv[X, vaux, x] =
∑
v∈Vsan,X[v]=x
µ(vaux, v)
∑
v∈Vsan,X[v] 6=⊥
µ(vaux, v)
Adv[Y, uaux, vaux, y] =∑
u,v∈Vsan ,Y [u,v]=y
µ˜(uaux,u)µ˜(vaux,v)∑
u,v∈Vsan,Y [u,v] 6=⊥
µ˜(uaux,u)µ˜(vaux,v)
Because the auxiliary graph need not be a subgraph of
the target graph, the mapping may not be complete, and the
mapping adversary’s posterior knowledge Adv of an attribute
value is only defined for nodes vaux that have actually been
mapped to nodes in the target graph, at least one of which
has a non-null value for this attribute. Formally, Adv is
defined if there is a non-zero number of nodes v ∈ Vsan
such that µ˜(vaux, v) > 0 and X [v] 6=⊥. Edge attributes are
treated similarly.
The probability of a given node having a particular
attribute value can be computed in other ways, e.g., by
looking only at the most likely mapping. This does not make
a significant difference in practice.
We say that privacy of vsan is compromised if, for some
attribute X which takes value x in Ssan and is designated
as “private” by the privacy policy, the adversary’s belief that
X [vaux] = x increases by more than δ, which is a pre-
specified privacy parameter. For simplicity, we assume that
the privacy policy PP is global, i.e., the attribute is either
public, or private for all nodes (respectively, edges). More
granular policies are discussed in Appendix D.
Definition 3 (Privacy breach): For nodes uaux, vaux ∈
Vaux, let µG(uaux) = usan and µG(vaux) = vsan. We
say that the privacy of vsan is breached w.r.t. adversary Adv
and privacy parameter δ if
(a) for some attribute X such that PP[X ] = priv,
Adv[X, vaux, x] − Aux[X, vaux, x] > δ where x =
X [vaux], or
(b) for some attribute Y such that PP[Y ] = priv, Adv[Y,
uaux, vaux, y] − Aux[Y, uaux, vaux, y] > δ where y =
Y [uaux, vaux].
Definition 3 should be viewed as a meta-definition or a
template, and must be carefully adapted to each instance of
the re-identification attack and each concrete attribute. This
involves subjective judgment. For example, did a privacy
breach occur if the the attacker’s confidence increased for
some attributes and decreased for others? Learning common-
sense knowledge from the sanitized network (for example,
that all nodes have fewer than 1000 neighbors) does not in-
tuitively constitute a privacy breach, even though it satisfies
Definition 3 for the “node degree” attribute. Such common-
sense knowledge must be included in the attacker’s Aux.
Then learning it from the sanitized graph does not constitute
a privacy breach.
4.5. Measuring success of an attack
While it is tempting to quantify de-anonymization of
social networks in terms of the fraction of nodes affected,
this results in a fairly meaningless metric. Consider the
following thought experiment. Given a network G = (V,E),
imagine the network G′ consisting of G augmented with
|V | singleton nodes. Re-identification fails on the singletons
because there is no edge information associated with them,
and, therefore, the naı¨ve metric returns half the value on
G′ as it does on G. Intuitively, however, the presence of
singletons should not affect the performance of any de-
anonymization algorithm.
This is not merely hypothetical. In many online networks,
the majority of nodes show little or no observable activity
after account creation. Restricting one’s attention to the giant
connected component does not solve the problem, either,
because extraneous nodes with degree 1 instead of 0 would
have essentially the same (false) impact on naı¨vely measured
performance.
Instead, we assign a weight to each affected node in
proportion to its importance in the network. Importance is a
subjective notion, but can be approximated by node central-
ity, which is a well-studied concept in sociology that only
recently came to the attention of computer scientists [40],
[19], [54], [3], [45].
There are three groups of centrality measures: local,
eigenvalue-based and distance-based. Local methods such as
degree centrality consider only the neighbors of the node.
Eigenvalue methods also consider the centrality of each
neighbor, resulting in a convergent recursive computation.
Distance-based measures consider path lengths from a node
to different points in the network. A well-known eigenvalue-
based measure was proposed by Bonacich in [12], while [37]
presents a textbook treatment of centrality.
We find that the decision to use a centrality measure at
all, as opposed to a naı¨ve metric such as the raw fraction
of nodes de-anonymized, is much more important than the
actual choice of the measure. We therefore use the simplest
possible measure, degree centrality, where each node is
weighted in proportion to its degree. In a directed graph,
we use the sum of in-degree and out-degree.
There is an additional methodological issue. For a mapped
pair of nodes, should we use the centrality score from the
target graph or the auxiliary graph? It is helpful to go back
to the pathological example that we used to demonstrate the
inadequacy of fraction-based metrics. If either of the nodes
in the mapped pair is a singleton, then the de-anonymization
algorithm clearly has no hope of finding that pair. Therefore,
we compute the centrality in both graphs and take the
minimum of the two. We believe that this formulation
captures most closely the spirit of the main question we are
answering in this paper: “what proportion of entities that are
active in a social network and for which non-trivial auxiliary
information is available can be re-identified?”
Given a probabilistic mapping µ˜, we say that a (concrete)
mapping is sampled from µ˜ if for each u, µ(u) is sampled
according to µ˜(u, .).
Definition 4 (Success of de-anonymization): Let
Vmapped = {v ∈ Vaux : µG(v) 6=⊥}. The success rate
of a de-anonymization algorithm outputting a probabilistic
mapping µ˜, w.r.t. a centrality measure ν, is the probability
that µ sampled from µ˜ maps a node v to µG(v) if v is
selected according to ν:
∑
v∈Vmapped
PR[µ(v) = µG(v)]ν(v)
∑
v∈Vmapped
ν(v)
The error rate is the probability that µ maps a node v to
any node other than µG(v):
∑
v∈Vmapped
PR[µ(v) 6=⊥ ∧µ(v) 6= µG(v)]ν(v)
∑
v∈Vmapped
ν(v)
The probability is taken over the inherent randomness of
the de-anonymization algorithm as well as the sampling of
µ from µ˜. Note that the error rate includes the possibility
that µG(v) =⊥ and µ(v) 6=⊥.
The above measure only gives a lower bound on privacy
breach because privacy can be violated without complete de-
anonymization. Therefore, if the goal is to protect privacy,
it is not enough to show that this measure is low. It is also
necessary to show that Definition 3 is not satisfied. Observe,
for example, that simply creating k copies of the graph tech-
nically prevents de-anonymization and even satisfies naı¨ve
syntactic definitions such as k-anonymity, while completely
violating any reasonable definition of privacy.
In the other direction, however, breaking Definition 4 for
a large fraction of nodes—as our algorithm of Section 5
does—is sufficient to break privacy via Definition 3, as long
some trivial conditions are met: at least one private attribute
is released as part of Xsan, and the adversary possesses
little or no auxiliary information about this attribute.
5. De-anonymization
Our re-identification algorithm runs in two stages. First,
the attacker identifies a small number of “seed” nodes which
are present both in the anonymous target graph and the
attacker’s auxiliary graph, and maps them to each other.
The main, propagation stage is a self-reinforcing process in
which the seed mapping is extended to new nodes using only
the topology of the network, and the new mapping is fed
back to the algorithm. The eventual result is a large mapping
between subgraphs of the auxiliary and target networks
which re-identifies all mapped nodes in the latter.
5.1. Seed identification
While algorithms for seed identification are not our pri-
mary technical contribution, they are a key step in enabling
our overall algorithm to succeed. Here we describe one
possible seed identification algorithm. The attacks in [7] can
also be considered seed identification algorithms. We briefly
discuss alternatives at the end of Section 6.1.
We assume that the attacker’s individual auxiliary infor-
mation (see Section 4.3) consists of a clique of k nodes
which are present both in the auxiliary and the target graphs.
It is sufficient to know the degree of each of these nodes and
the number of common neighbors for each pair of nodes.
The seed-finding algorithm takes as inputs (1) the target
graph, (2) k seed nodes in the auxiliary graph, (3) k node-
degree values, (4) (k2
)
pairs of common-neighbor counts,
and (5) error parameter ǫ. The algorithm searches the target
graph for a unique k-clique with matching (within a factor of
1± ǫ) node degrees and common-neighbor counts. If found,
the algorithm maps the nodes in the clique to the corre-
sponding nodes in the auxiliary graph; otherwise, failure is
reported.
While this brute-force search is exponential in k, in
practice this turns out not to be a problem. First, if the degree
is bounded by d, then the complexity is O(ndk−1). Second,
the running time is heavily input-dependent, and the inputs
with high running time turn out to produce a large number
of matches. Terminating the algorithm as soon as more than
one match is found greatly decreases the running time.
5.2. Propagation
The propagation algorithm takes as input two graphs
G1 = (V1, E1) and G2 = (V2, E2) and a partial “seed”
mapping µS between the two. It outputs a mapping µ.
One may consider probabilistic mappings, but we found it
simpler to focus on deterministic 1-1 mappings µ:V1 → V2.
Intuitively, the algorithm finds new mappings using the
topological structure of the network and the feedback from
previously constructed mappings. It is robust to mild mod-
ifications of the topology such as those introduced by
sanitization. At each iteration, the algorithm starts with the
accumulated list of mapped pairs between V1 and V2. It picks
an arbitrary unmapped node u in V1 and computes a score
for each unmapped node v in V2, equal to the number of
neighbors of u that have been mapped to neighbors of v. If
the strength of the match (see below) is above a threshold,
the mapping between u and v is added to the list, and the
next iteration starts. There are a few additional details and
heuristics that we describe below.
Eccentricity. Eccentricity is a heuristic defined in [61] in
the context of de-anonymizing databases. It measures how
much an item in a set X “stands out” from the rest, and is
defined as
max(X)−max2(X)
σ(X)
where max and max2 denote the highest and second highest
values, respectively, and σ denotes the standard deviation.
Our algorithm measures the eccentricity of the set of map-
ping scores (between a single node in v1 and each unmapped
node in v2) and rejects the match if the eccentricity score is
below a threshold.
Edge directionality. Recall that we are dealing with
directed graphs. To compute the mapping score between a
pair of nodes u and v, the algorithm computes two scores–
the first based only on the incoming edges of u and v, and
the second based only on the outgoing edges. These scores
are then summed.
Node degrees. The mapping scores as described above are
biased in favor of nodes with high degrees. To compensate
for this bias, the score of each node is divided by the square
root of its degree. The resemblance to cosine similarity4 is
not superficial: the rationale is the same.
Revisiting nodes. At the early stages of the algorithm,
there are few mappings to work with, and therefore the
algorithm makes more errors. As the algorithm progresses,
the number of mapped nodes increases and the error rate
goes down. Thus the need to revisit already mapped nodes:
the mapping computed when revisiting a node may be
different because of the new mappings that have become
available.
4. The cosine similarity measure between two sets X and Y is defined
when neither is empty: cos(X, Y ) = |X∩Y |√
|X||Y |
.
Reverse match. The algorithm is completely agnostic
about the semantics of the two graphs. It does not matter
whether G1 is the target graph and G2 is the auxiliary graph,
or vice versa. Each time a node u maps to v, the mapping
scores are computed with the input graphs switched. If v
gets mapped back to u, the mapping is retained; otherwise,
it is rejected.
The following pseudocode describes the algorithm in
detail. theta is a parameter that controls the tradeoff
between the yield and the accuracy.
function propagationStep(lgraph, rgraph, mapping)
for lnode in lgraph.nodes:
scores[lnode] = matchScores(lgraph, rgraph, mapping, lnode)
if eccentricity(scores[lnode]) < theta: continue
rnode = (pick node from right.nodes where
scores[lnode][node] = max(scores[lnode]))
scores[rnode] = matchScores(rgraph, lgraph, invert(mapping), rnode)
if eccentricity(scores[rnode]) < theta: continue
reverse_match = (pick node from lgraph.nodes where
scores[rnode][node] = max(scores[rnode]))
if reverse_match != lnode:
continue
mapping[lnode] = rnode
function matchScores(lgraph, rgraph, mapping, lnode)
initialize scores = [0 for rnode in rgraph.nodes]
for (lnbr, lnode) in lgraph.edges:
if lnbr not in mapping: continue
rnbr = mapping[lnbr]
for (rnbr, rnode) in rgraph.edges:
if rnode in mapping.image: continue
scores[rnode] += 1 / rnode.in_degree ˆ 0.5
for (lnode, lnbr) in lgraph.edges:
if lnbr not in mapping: continue
rnbr = mapping[lnbr]
for (rnode, rnbr) in rgraph.edges:
if rnode in mapping.image: continue
scores[rnode] += 1 / rnode.out_degree ˆ 0.5
return scores
function eccentricity(items)
return (max(items) - max2(items)) / std_dev(items)
until convergence do:
propagationStep(lgraph, rgraph, seed_mapping)
Complexity. Ignoring revisiting nodes and reverse matches,
the complexity of the algorithm is O(|E1|d2), where d2 is
a bound on the degree of the nodes in V2. To see this, let
µpart be the partial mapping computed at any stage of the
algorithm. For each u ∈ V1 and each v adjacent to u such
that v ∈ domain(µpart), the algorithm examines each of the
neighbors of µpart(v), giving an upper bound of |E1|d2.
Assuming that a node is revisited only if the number of
already-mapped neighbors of the node has increased by at
least 1, we get a bound of O(|E1|d1d2), where d1 is a bound
on the degree of the nodes in V1. Finally, taking reverse
mappings into account, we get O((|E1|+ |E2|)d1d2).
6. Experiments
We used data from three large online social networks in
our experiments. The first graph is the “follow” relationships
on the Twitter microblogging service, which we crawled in
late 2007. The second graph is the “contact” relationships
on Flickr, a photo-sharing service, which we crawled in late
2007/early 2008. Both services have APIs that expose a
mandatory username field, and optional fields name and
location. The latter is represented as free-form text. The
final graph is the “friend” relationships on the LiveJournal
blogging service; we obtained it from the authors of [58].
The parameters of the three graphs are summarized below.
In computing the average degree, the degree of a node is
counted as the sum of its in- and out-degrees. Further details
about the crawling process can be found in Appendix F.
Network Nodes Edges Av. Deg
Twitter 224K 8.5M 37.7
Flickr 3.3M 53M 32.2
LiveJournal 5.3M 77M 29.3
6.1. Seed identification
To demonstrate feasibility of seed identification, we ran
the algorithm of Section 5.1 with the LiveJournal graph as its
target. Recall from Section 4.3 that the auxiliary information
needed to create seed mappings comes from the users of
the target network. Therefore, we can evaluate feasibility of
seed identification simply by measuring how much auxiliary
information is needed to identify a unique node in the
target graph. We emphasize that our main de-anonymization
algorithm needs only a handful of such nodes.
For simplicity, we assume that the attacker only has access
to the undirected graph, where an edge is included only if
it is symmetrical in the original graph. This underestimates
the re-identification rate, because the attacker would have
more information if directionality of edges were considered.
We synthetically generate auxiliary information for seed
identification starting from randomly sampled cliques. To
sample a clique of size k, we start from a random node and,
at every stage, randomly pick a node which is adjacent to
all the nodes picked so far. If there is no such node, we start
over.
This method does not sample uniformly from all the
cliques in the graph; the distribution of selected nodes is
much more equitable. If we sample a k-clique uniformly,
it is susceptible to anomalies in the graph that make the
result meaningless. If the graph has a large clique, or even
a large dense subgraph, then almost every k-clique sampled
will belong to this large clique or subgraph.
Given a clique (specifically, a 4-clique), we assume that
the attacker knows the degrees of these 4 nodes as well as
the number of common neighbors of each of the 6 pairs.
The auxiliary information may be imprecise, and the search
algorithm treats a 4-clique in the target graph as a match as
long as each degree and common-neighbor count matches
within a factor of 1 ± ǫ, where ǫ is the error parameter
(intuitively, the higher the error, the noisier the auxiliary
information and the lower the re-identification rate). Figure 1
shows how re-identification rate decreases with noise. Recall
Figure 1. Seed identification
that we allow at most one match, and so the attacker
never makes an error as long as his assumptions about the
imprecision of his auxiliary information are correct.
This experiment establishes that seed identification is
feasible in practice. If anything, it underestimates how easy
this is to do in the real world, where the attacker can use aux-
iliary information other than degrees and common-neighbor
counts. Searching based on the structure of the target users’
graph neighborhoods allows re-identification with just two or
even a single node, although this is algorithmically complex.
6.2. Propagation
6.2.1. Robustness against perturbation and seed selec-
tion. The most remarkable feature of our propagation al-
gorithm is that it achieves “viral,” self-reinforcing, large-
scale re-identification regardless of the number of seeds,
as long as the latter is above a (low) threshold. To study
this behavior, we carried out an experiments on pairs of
subgraphs, over 100,000 nodes each, of a real-world social
network. In each experiment, one of the subgraphs was used
as the auxiliary information, the other as the target. The
graphs were artificially perturbed by adding different levels
of noise to achieve various degrees of edge overlap.
Perturbation strategy. Given a real network graph G =
(V,E), our goal is to sample subsets V1, V2 of V such
that V1 and V2 have an overlap of αV . Overlap is mea-
sured in terms of the Jaccard Coefficient, which is de-
fined for two sets X and Y if one of them is non-empty:
JC(X,Y ) = |X∩Y ||X∪Y | . Thus, if each of two sets shares
half its members with the other, the overlap is 13 . We
simply partition V randomly into three subsets VA, VB , VC
of size 1−αV2 |V |, αV |V |,
1−αV
2 |V |, respectively, and set
V1 = VA ∪ VB and V2 = VB ∪ VC .
We use one subgraph as the auxiliary information and
the other as the anonymous target graph. As mentioned
in Section 2, we believe that introducing noise via edge
deletions and additions is the only realistic method of
perturbing the edges. Our goal is to simulate the effect of
perturbation on the target graph as follows (Procedure A):
• Derive E′ from E by adding edges.
• Derive E′′ from E′ by randomly deleting edges.
• Project E and E′′ on V1 and V2, respectively, to obtain
E1 and E2.
The best way to add edges is to use link prediction, which
will result in plausible fake edges. Instead of choosing a
specific link prediction algorithm, we perform the following
(Procedure B):
• Make two copies of E and independently delete edges
at random from each copy.
• Project the copies on V1 and V2, respectively, to get E1
and E2.
It should be clear that Procedure B produces more plau-
sible edges than even the best concrete link prediction
algorithm. If the link prediction algorithm is perfect, i.e., if
the edge additions accomplish the reverse of random edge
deletion, then the two procedures are more or less equivalent
(E′ in Procedure A corresponds to E in Procedure B; E
and E′′ in Procedure A correspond to the two perturbed
copies in Procedure B). If the link prediction is not perfect,
then Procedure B is better in the sense that it leads to
more realistic noise, and thus makes the task of our de-
anonymization algorithm harder.
This leaves the question of what fraction β of edges
to remove to get an edge overlap of αE . The fraction of
common edges is (1− β)2, while the fraction of edges left
in at least one of the copies is 1− β2, giving (1−β)
2
1−β2 = αE ,
which yields β = 1−αE1+αE as the only valid solution. Note that
the edge overlap is calculated for the subgraphs formed by
the overlapping nodes. The overlap between E1 and E2 is
much lower.
Results. We investigated the impact that the number of
seeds has on the ability of the propagation algorithm to
achieve large-scale re-identification, and also its robustness
to perturbation.
Figure 2 shows that the selection of seeds determines
whether propagation step dies out or not (cf. phase tran-
sition [89]), but whenever large-scale propagation has been
achieved, the re-identification rate stays remarkably constant.
We find that when the algorithm dies out, it re-identifies no
more than a few dozen nodes correctly.
We performed a further experiment to study the phase
transition better. A run is classified as successful if it re-
identifies at least 1,000 nodes. Figure 3 shows the resulting
probabilities of large-scale propagation. The phase transition
is somewhat less sharp than might appear from Figure 2,
although the window is almost completely in the range
Figure 2. The fraction of nodes re-identified depends
sharply on the number of seeds. Node overlap: 25%;
Edge overlap: 50%
Figure 3. The phase transition in more detail. Node
overlap: 25%; Edge overlap: 50%
[15,45].
It must be noted that the number of seeds required to
trigger propagation depends heavily on the parameters of
the graph and the algorithm used for seed selection. We
therefore caution against reading too much into the numbers.
What this experiment shows is that a phase transition does
happen and that it is strongly dependent on the number of
seeds. Therefore, the adversary can collect seed mappings
incrementally until he has enough mappings to carry out
large-scale re-identification.
Figure 4 shows that imprecision of the auxiliary infor-
mation decreases the percentage of nodes re-identified, but
cannot prevent large-scale re-identification.
Figure 4. Effect of noise. Node overlap: 25%; Number
of seeds: 50
6.2.2. Mapping between two real-world social networks.
As our main experiment, we ran our propagation algorithm
with the graph of Flickr as the auxiliary information and the
anonymous graph of Twitter as the target.
Ground truth. To verify our results, we had to determine
the ground truth, i.e., the true mapping between the two
graphs. We produced ground-truth mappings based on exact
matches in either the username, or name field. Once a
match is found, we compute a score based on a variety
of heuristics on all three fields (username, name and
location). If the score is too low, we reject the match as
spurious.
• For usernames, we use the length to measure the likeli-
hood that a username match is spurious. The rationale
is that a username such as “tamedfalcon213” is more
likely to be identifying than “joe”.
• For names, we use the length of the names, as well as
the frequency of occurrence of the first and last names.
Rarer names indicate a stronger match.
• For locations, we use heuristics such as two-letter state
abbreviations.
This resulted in around 27,000 mappings, which we
will call µ(G). Since these mappings were computed with
a completely different information than used by the de-
anonymization algorithm, errors in the ground truth can only
degrade the reported performance of our de-anonymization
algorithm. We picked a random sample of the mappings and
verified by human inspection that the error rate is well under
5%.
Of course, some of those who use both Flickr and Twitter
may use completely different usernames and names on the
two services and are thus not included in our ground-truth
mappings. This has no effect on the reported performance of
our algorithm. When it does recognize two nodes as belong-
ing to the same user, it is rarely wrong, and, furthermore, it
can successfully re-identify thousands of users.
It is possible that our algorithm has a better performance
on the nodes where the ground truth is known than on other
nodes. For example, users who acquire distinctive usernames
on both websites might be habitual early adopters of web
services. Thus, the numbers below must be interpreted with
caution.
Our seed mapping consisted of 150 pairs of nodes selected
randomly from µ(G), with the constraint that the degree of
each mapped node in the auxiliary graph is at least 80. More
opportunistic seed selection can lower the number of seeds
required.
The accuracy of our algorithm on µ(G) (weighted by
centrality—see Section 4.5) is summarized below:
• 30.8% of the mappings were re-identified correctly,
12.1% were identified incorrectly, and 57% were not
identified.
• 41% of the incorrectly identified mappings (5% overall)
were mapped to nodes which are at a distance 1 from
the true mapping. It appears likely that human intelli-
gence can be used to complete the de-anonymization
in many of these cases.
• 55% of the incorrectly identified mappings (6.7%
overall) were mapped to nodes where the same geo-
graphic location was reported.5 Thus, even when re-
identification does not succeed, the algorithm can often
identify a node as belonging to a cluster of similar
nodes, which might reveal sensitive information (recall
the discussion in Section 4.4).
• The above two categories overlap; of all the incorrect
mappings, only 27% (or 3.3% overall) fall into neither
category and are completely erroneous.
7. Conclusion
The main lesson of this paper is that anonymity is not
sufficient for privacy when dealing with social networks. We
developed a generic re-identification algorithm and showed
that it can successfully de-anonymize several thousand users
in the anonymous graph of a popular microblogging ser-
vice (Twitter), using a completely different social network
(Flickr) as the source of auxiliary information.
Our experiments underestimate the extent of the privacy
risks of anonymized social networks. The overlap between
Twitter and Flickr membership at the time of our data
collection was relatively small. Considering only the users
who supplied their names (about a third in either network),
24% of the names associated with Twitter accounts occur
in Flickr, while 5% of the names associated with Flickr ac-
counts occur in Twitter. Since human names are not unique,
5. This was measured by sampling 200 of the erroneous mappings and
using human analysis. We consider the geographical location to be the same
if it is either the same non-U.S. country, or the same U.S. state.
this overestimates the overlap in membership. By contrast,
64% of Facebook users are also present on MySpace [66].
As social networks grow larger and include a greater frac-
tion of the population along with their relationships, the
overlap increases. Therefore, we expect that our algorithm
can achieve an even greater re-identification rate on larger
networks.
We demonstrated feasibility of successful re-identification
based solely on the network topology and assuming that
the target graph is completely anonymized. In reality,
anonymized graphs are usually released with at least
some attributes in their nodes and edges, making de-
anonymization even easier. Furthermore, any of the thou-
sands of third-party application developers for popular on-
line social networks, the dozens of advertising companies,
governments who have access to telephone call logs, and
anyone who can compile aggregated graphs of the form
described in Section 2 have access to auxiliary information
which is much richer than what we used in our experiments.
At the same time, an ever growing number of third parties
get access to sensitive social-network data in anonymized
form. These two trends appear to be headed for a colli-
sion resulting in major privacy breaches, and any potential
solution would appear to necessitate a fundamental shift
in business models and practices and clearer privacy laws
on the subject of Personally Identifiable Information (see
Appendix B).
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Appendix A.
Glossary
Basic terms.
• S: a social network, consisting of:
– G: a graph containing nodes V and edges E
– X : a set of node attributes
– Y: a set of edge attributes
• X : a node attribute, part of X .
• X [v]: the value of the attribute X on the node v
• Y : an edge attribute, part of Y .
• Y [e]: the value of the attribute Y on the edge e
• PP: a privacy policy
Sanitized and auxiliary data
• Ssan: a sanitized social network, defined analogously.
• Gsan, a sanitized graph, containing Vsan ⊂ V and
Esan, a noisy version of E
• Saux: the attacker’s aggregate auxiliary information,
consisting of
– Gaux = (Vaux, Eaux)
– Aux = AuxX ∪ AuxY , (probabilistic) auxiliary
information about node and edge attributes
• Aux[X, v]: the probability distribution of the attacker’s
knowledge of the value of the attribute X on the node
v
• Aux[Y, e]: likewise for edge attributes
Re-identification
• µG(.): ground truth, a 1-1 mapping between Vaux and
Vsan
• µ˜(., .): a probabilistic mapping output by a re-
identification algorithm
• µ(.): a specific mapping between Vaux and Vsan
sampled from µ˜
• ν(v): node centrality (Section 4.5).
• αV : node overlap between Vaux and Vsan (Section
6.2.1)
• αE : edge overlap between Eaux and Esan projected
on Vmapped (Section 6.2.1)
• ǫ: noise parameter (for seed identification)
• β: noise parameter (for propagation; Section 6.2.1)
Appendix B.
On “Personally Identifiable Information”
“Personally identifiable information” is a legal term used
in two related but distinct contexts. The first context is a
series of breach-disclosure laws enacted in recent years in
response to security breaches involving customer data that
could enable identity theft.
California Senate Bill 1386 [13] is a representative exam-
ple. It defines “personal information” as follows:
[An] individual’s first name or first initial and last
name in combination with any one or more of the
following data elements, when either the name or
the data elements are not encrypted:
• Social security number.
• Driver’s license number or California Identi-
fication Card number.
• Account number, credit or debit card number,
in combination with any required security
code, access code, or password that would per-
mit access to an individual’s financial account.
Two points are worthy of note. First, the spirit of the
terminology is to capture the types of information that
are commonly used for authenticating an individual. This
reflects the bill’s intent to deter identity theft. Consequently,
data such as email addresses and telephone numbers do not
fall under the scope of this law. Second, it is the personal
information itself that is sensitive, rather than the fact that it
is possible to associate sensitive information with an identity.
The second context in which the term “personally identi-
fiable information” appears is the privacy law. In the United
States, the Privacy Act of 1974 [84] regulates the collection
of personal information by government agencies, but there is
no overarching law regulating private entities. At least three
such acts introduced in 2005 failed to pass: the Privacy Act
of 2005 [88], the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2005
[86], and the Online Privacy Protection Act of 2005 [87].
However, there do exist laws for specific types of data such
as the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) [83] and the
Health Insurance Privacy and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
The language from the HIPAA Privacy Rule [85] is
representative:
Individually identifiable health information is in-
formation
[. . . ]
1) That identifies the individual; or
2) With respect to which there is a reasonable
basis to believe the information can be used
to identify the individual.
The spirit of the law clearly encompasses deductive dis-
closure, and the term “reasonable basis” leaves the defining
line open to interpretation by case law. We are not aware of
any court decisions that define identifiability.
Individual U.S. states do have privacy protection laws that
apply to any operator, such as California’s Online Privacy
Protection Act of 2003 [14]. Some countries other than the
United States have similar generic laws, such as Canada’s
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act (PIPEDA) [65]. The European Union is notorious for
the broad scope and strict enforcement of its privacy laws—
the EU privacy directive defines “personal data” as follows
[26]:
any information relating to an identified or identi-
fiable natural person [. . . ]; an identifiable person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number
or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.”
It is clear from the above that privacy law, as opposed
to breach-disclosure law, in general interprets personally
identifiable information broadly, in a way that is not covered
by syntactic anonymization. This distinction appears to be
almost universally lost on companies that collect and share
personal information, as illustrated by the following Senate
Committee testimony by Chris Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer
of Facebook [42]:
The critical distinction that we embrace in our
policies and practices, and that we want our users
to understand, is between the use of personal
information for advertisements in personally-
identifiable form, and the use, dissemination, or
sharing of information with advertisers in non-
personally-identifiable form. Ad targeting that
shares or sells personal information to advertisers
(name, email, other contact oriented information)
without user control is fundamentally different
from targeting that only gives advertisers the abil-
ity to present their ads based on aggregate data.
Finally, it is important to understand that the term “per-
sonally identifiable information” has no particular techni-
cal meaning. Algorithms that can identify a user in an
anonymized dataset are agnostic to the semantics of the
data elements. While some data elements may be uniquely
identifying on their own, any element can be identifying
in combination with others. The feasibility of such re-
identification has been amply demonstrated by the AOL
privacy fiasco [10], de-anonymization of the Netflix Prize
dataset [61], and the work presented in this paper. It is
regrettable that the mistaken dichotomy between personally
identifying and non-personally identifying attributes has
crept into the technical literature in phrases such as “quasi-
identifier.”
Appendix C.
“Identity” in social networks
The correspondence between accounts or profiles (i.e.,
network nodes) and real-world identities varies greatly from
social network to social network. A wired telephone may
be shared by a family or an office, while mobile phones
are much more likely to belong to a single person. Some
online social networks such as Facebook attempt to ensure
that accounts accurately reflect real-world information [80],
while others such as MySpace are notoriously lax [53]. Fake
MySpace profiles have been created for pets and celebrities,
and a user may create multiple profiles with contradictory
or fake information.
In this paper, we eschew an explicit notion of identity
and focus instead on entities, which are simply sources
of social-network profile information that are consistent
across different networks and service providers. In most
cases, an entity is associated with a real-world person, but
does not have to be (e.g., consider a political campaign
which has a YouTube account and a Twitter account). The
concept of entities also allows us to capture information
which is characteristic of a user across multiple networks—
for example, an unusual username—but is not related to
anything in the real world.
In our model, nodes are purely collections of their at-
tributes, and to identify a node simply means to learn the
entity to which the node belongs, whether this entity is a
single person, a group, or an organization. We assume that
correctly associating a node with the corresponding entity
constitutes a breach of anonymity. The question of whether
the entity is a single individual or not is extraneous to our
model.
Appendix D.
Challenges of defining privacy
The fact that we are dealing with non-relational data
makes it difficult to come up with a comprehensive defi-
nition of privacy in social networks. In general, one would
like to say that properties of individual nodes should be
privacy-sensitive and thus difficult to learn from the sanitized
network, while aggregate properties should be learnable.
But what counts as a ”property of an individual node?” A
natural candidate is any property about a k-neighborhood
for some small k (for instance, a property that a user
has 3 different paths of length 2 to a known Al-Qaeda
operative). Unfortunately, there does not seem to be an
elegant way of choosing k because social-network graphs
have a very small diameter due to the “six degrees of
separation” phenomenon [82].
A related approach is differential privacy [23], which
in the social-network context would require that the graph
look roughly the same if any single node is removed. It
is not obvious how to define node removal, and far from
clear how to achieve differential privacy on graph-structured
data, because aggregate properties of a graph can change
substantially with the removal of a single node.
Even when the privacy policy is defined as a simple
labeling of attributes (as we do in Section 4.4), the policy can
be global or granular. With a global policy, the same privacy
label applies to a given attribute in every node (e.g., email
addresses are either public for all members, or private for
all members). Similarly, the edges in the network are either
all public, or all private. With granular policies, the privacy
setting can be different for each edge and each attribute of
each node.
A global policy is sufficient most of the time. In most
contexts, the network operator promises users that none
of their data will be released in a personally identifiable
way, implying a privacy policy where all edges and all
attributes are private. In other contexts, some attributes might
be intuitively understood to be public (e.g., node degree) and
others private.
Many online social-network services such as Facebook
allow users to configure their individual privacy policy with
a high level of granularity. This might become a common
practice in the future, but so far it appears that the vast ma-
jority of users do not change their default settings [34], [46].
There is also some ambiguity in modeling user preferences
as formal privacy policies: for instance, an edge may be
considered public by one endpoint and private by the other.
To keep the model simple and tractable, we do not use
richer formalisms which may be suitable for some situations.
For example, a multi-graph is a better model for social
networks representing phone calls between individuals. We
ignore the complex structure of node and edge attributes that
may be relevant to privacy, such as “X knows Y through Z.”
We only use “public” and “private” as privacy labels, even
though some networks allow more levels such as “viewable
by friends,” or even friends of friends.
Appendix E.
Measuring the effect of perturbation
The Jaccard Coefficient can be used to measure the
amount of perturbation introduced to the sanitized graph
Ssan during the release process:
∑
u∈Vsan
ν(u)JC(u)
∑
u∈Vsan
ν(u)
where ν(u) is the centrality of the node u and the Jaccard
Coefficient JC(u) is defined in this context as follows:
|{v ∈ V˜ : (E(u, v) ∧ E˜(u, v)) ∨ (E(v, u) ∧ E˜(v, u))}|
|{v ∈ V˜ :E(u, v) ∨ E˜(u, v) ∨ E(v, u) ∨ E˜(v, u)}|
where V˜ = Vsan and E˜ = Esan. In the above expres-
sion, the numerator counts the number of edges that are left
unchanged in Esan, taking directionality into account. The
denominator counts all edges that exist in either direction in
either E, or Esan.
A more obvious measure that simply counts the number
of edges added or removed, as a fraction of the total
number of edges, would ignore the effect of perturbation on
individual nodes. By contrast, our measure takes this into
account, weighing nodes in proportion to their centrality in
the network (this is the purpose of the ν factor).
Appendix F.
Notes on data acquisition
Typically, a network crawl can only recover the giant
connected component. Both Twitter and Flickr allow to
query only forward links. Therefore, we can expect to
recover the strongly-connected component (SCC) fully and
the weakly connected component (WCC) incompletely.
We crawled the entire SCC of Twitter, subject to the
caveat that the Twitter API for discovering relationships
is indirect; in particular, we cannot discover users whose
activity on the website is “protected,” i.e., viewable by
friends only. Interestingly, the size of the Twitter user
population, at least as reflected in the connected component
of regular users, turned out to be much smaller than was
being reported in the media at the time of our crawl. It
is also worth noting that since then Twitter has introduced
crippling rate limitations on its API, which make a large-
scale crawl infeasible.
We could not crawl the entire SCC of the Flickr graph due
to its size. We crawled it in a priority-queue fashion, giving
the highest priority to the nodes with the highest number of
incoming edges from the already crawled nodes. Comparing
our numbers with [58], we conclude that we have, in fact,
recovered most of the SCC.
Finally, the authors of [58], who kindly provided with us
with the LiveJournal data, report that their crawl covers the
vast majority of the users in LiveJournal’s WCC.
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